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Abstract
This is an essay on judicial discourse in Singapore and Malaysia pertaining to the nature and
scope of the right of access to justice, including access to justice for the poor. We will examine
the statements and pronouncements by the Singapore and Malaysia judiciary in case precedents
and extra-judicial statements. Some of the issues explored include the legal status of this right
of access to justice (namely, whether it is a right enshrined in the constitution or merely a right
derived from the common law and whether it is qualified by economic and other interests) and the
associated rights of legal representation, legal aid and contingency fees.
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
There are various ways in which the potential litigant can vindicate his legal 
rights within the parameters of the legal system subject to the resource constraints 
of the litigant and society. Access to justice involves being able to access the 
courts and judicial remedies as well as legal representation. It also involves the 
right of ordinary citizens to challenge administrative decisions affecting their 
legal rights, their access to legislative reforms through lobbying and the 
observance of the procedural requirements of audi alteram partem. To resolve 
problems related to access to justice, the contribution of various institutions and 
stakeholders, including the legislatures, government agencies such as the legal aid 
bureaux, local communities, non-government organisations and civil society, 
lawyers and the courts is vital.  
Within the legal system, enhancing access to justice is to the benefit of the 
general public, especially the poor and the vulnerable. The purpose is not merely 
to enhance access to justice, but to ensure equal access to justice and a level 
playing field for all members of the society.1  However, it is recognised that 
absolute equality is utopian and unlikely to be achieved in any society, due to 
scarce resources and the need to achieve efficient allocation thereof.2 
The theoretical foundations of the “access-to-justice” movement have 
been eloquently described by Cappelletti. It arose from a reaction against legal 
formalism and dogmatism3 to a greater recognition of the complexity of human 
society.4 Cappelletti aptly summarises the main thrust of the movement - 
 
[i]n the access to justice approach, the principal elements are the people (with all 
their cultural, economic and social peculiarities), the institutions, the processes: 
people, institutions and processes which represent the elements from which law 
originates, lives and evolves. Moreover, the legal system is not seen as a separate, 
autonomous, “autopoietic” (self-generating) system, but as an inseparable and 
integrative part of the more complex social system, a part which cannot be 
artificially isolated from economics, ethics and politics.5 
 
This is an essay on judicial discourse in Singapore and Malaysia, two 
neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, pertaining to the nature and scope of 
                                                 
1 See Ross Cranston, How Law Works – The Machinery and Impact of Civil Justice (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p.36. 
2 An alternative target could be to achieve “adequate” access to justice: see Deborah L. Rhode, 
Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, 2004), p.20. 
3 The main representative schools here include the legal realists and the critical legal scholars: 
Mauro Cappelletti, “Access To Justice As A Theoretical Approach To Law And A Practical 
Programme For Reform” (1992) 109 South African Law Journal 22 at 23-25. 
4 Mauro Cappelletti, ibid, at 25. 
5 Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 3 at 25. 
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 the right of access to justice. As legal costs6 is one of the major obstacles to 
access to justice, we will also explore access to justice insofar as the interests of 
the poor are affected. By “judicial discourse”, we mean the statements and 
pronouncements by the Singapore and Malaysian judiciary – whether in case 
precedents or otherwise – which explicitly examine the nature and limits of the 
right of access to justice. Some of the questions which will be raised in this essay 
are: Does a right of access to justice exist? If so, what is the legal status of this 
right of access to justice? Is it a right enshrined in the constitution or merely a 
right derived from the common law? Are such rights qualified by economic and 
other interests? What about the associated rights of legal representation and the 
issues of legal aid and contingency fees? 
On the socio-economic front, both Singapore and Malaysia have 
performed well in the last few decades. In fact, Singapore’s socio-economic 
development has been regarded in some quarters as quite phenomenal, 
progressing from a developing country without a hinterland since its 
independence in 1965 to a developed nation within a mere three decades.7 As for 
Malaysia, the recent United Nations Human Development Report 2005 has 
categorised her as a middle-income and middle human development country.8  It 
has been observed that Malaysia’s economic plans since 1970 have been 
successful in reducing the incidence of poverty and income inequality over the 
last three decades, 9  though the needs of the relatively poorer rural areas in 
Malaysia10 and rising inter-ethnic inequality in income (in absolute terms)11 will 
                                                 
6 Michael Andersen, “Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive 
to Poor People in LDCs”, Institute of Development Studies, Law, Democracy and Development 
Series, Working Paper 178, February 2003, p. 16. 
7 E.g. Singapore has been regarded by the World Bank as a developed and high income economy. 
Online:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20
421402~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. The 
recent United Nations Human Development Report 2005 categorised Singapore as high-income 
and high human development (0.907 HDI in 2003, 25th position). Online: 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf. 
8 The score was 0.796 HDI in 2003 and she was placed in 61st position. Online: 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf. 
9 See Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, Federal Government Administrative 
Centre, Malaysia, “Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction, Growth and Racial Harmony”, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004, pp. 1 and 4; Robert EB Lucas and 
Donald W. Verry, “Growth and income distribution in Malaysia” (1996) 135(5) International 
Labour Review 553 at 556 (covering the period from 1970 to 1990 only). 
10 See Anwarul Yaqin, Law and Society in Malaysia (International Law Book Series, 1996) at p. 
195; the reduction of income disparities between rural and urban areas remains a concern in the 
Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010; see also “Malaysia plans $54 bn projects for rural poor”. Online: 
http://www.tradearabia.com/tanews/newsdetails_snINTBIZ_article102066.html (14 March 2006). 
11  See Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, chapter 16 (“Achieving Growth With Distribution”). 
Online: http://www.epu.jpm.my. 
2
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2
 have to be addressed. Singapore, an urbanised city-state, also has to contend with 
poverty issues12 and tackle the problem of the widening income gap between the 
“haves” and “have-nots”.13 
Thus, despite the commendable overall socio-economic development in 
Singapore and Malaysia, the fact remains that poverty exists in both countries. 
However, poverty includes more than just poverty line incomes based on certain 
basic needs and essentials14 – other dimensions such as the vulnerability and 
powerlessness of particular groups should be taken into consideration.15 In the 
context of access to justice, it is argued that the concept of poverty may have to be 
widened to include not only those who are below the poverty line, but also 
persons living above the poverty line who nevertheless experience financial 
difficulties in obtaining access to justice or who are placed in a materially 
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis other litigants in accessing justice. This lack of 
or unequal access to justice may be manifested in various circumstances, for 
example, in the lack of financial ability of the potential litigant to engage lawyers, 
ineligibility for legal aid or the onerous obligation to pay court fees.  
Singapore and Malaysia share a common constitutional history: 
Westminster-style constitutional traditions and English common law roots.16 Yet, 
judicial discourse on the nature and scope of this supposed right of access to 
justice differs in emphasis. In Malaysia, there is explicit judicial discourse (and 
debate) arising from recent decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Federal 
Court on the constitutional status (or lack thereof) of the right of access to justice. 
As will be apparent from the discussion in the next section, it is observed that 
although the judicial discourse in Malaysia has downplayed the right of access to 
justice and deprived it of any constitutional significance, the marked difference in 
                                                 
12 See Ho Ai Li, “Poverty: Generation Next”, The Straits Times (27 May 2006). In terms of 
relative poverty, 11% (or 340,000 persons) of the resident population per capita had household 
incomes of less than half the median of $500 per month in 1997; the comparative figure in Hong 
Kong was 14% in 1996: see “Household Income Growth and Distribution 1990-1997”, occasional 
paper, Singapore Department of Statistics, 1998 at para. 25. 
13  The Gini coefficient, as a measure of income inequality, increased slightly for resident 
households from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.444 in 1997: see “Household Income Growth and Distribution 
1990-1997”, occasional paper, Singapore Department of Statistics, 1998 at para. 20; the recent 
General Household Survey conducted by the Department of Statistics indicated that the Gini 
coefficient has continued to rise from 0.490 in 2000 to 0.522 in 2005: see Aaron Low, “Household 
Incomes up, Bottom Third’s Wages Down”, The Straits Times (29 June 2006); see also Roger 
Mitton, “For Richer or Poorer”, Asiaweek, Vol. 26 (44) (10 November 2000); Lydia Lim, “Power 
Struggles in the Heartland”, The Straits Times (27 May 2006). 
14 Anwarul Yaqin, supra note 10 at p. 194.  
15 See Michael Anderson, supra note 6 at p. 3. 
16 See generally, Gary Chan and Eugene Tan, “Introduction to the Singapore Legal System” in 
Andrew Phang (ed), Basic Principles of Singapore Business Law (Thomson, 2004) at pp. 3-51 
(particularly paras. 1.4 to 1.57). 
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 views between the Malaysian Court of Appeal and the Federal Court respectively 
should continue to generate great interest in constitutional law.  
On the other hand, there is less explicit examination by the Singapore 
judiciary on the constitutional status of the right of access to justice in recent 
years. This appears to be consistent with the present Singapore model of 
development based on the instrumental use of law and legal processes to achieve 
specific socio-economic objectives, as opposed to an emphasis on 
constitutionalism and human rights.17 This does not necessarily mean that the 
Singapore judiciary does not treat access to justice as a significant component of 
the administration of justice.  
There is voluminous literature on the practical implementation efforts of 
the Singapore judiciary in enhancing access to justice through case management, 
streamlining of litigation processes, the institution of the small claims tribunals 
and court-connected ADR processes,18 though the justice system in general and 
the viability and rationale of (at least some of) these measures in particular are not 
devoid of controversy and criticism.19 On the other hand, it is observed that there 
is no public interest litigation in Singapore, unlike in Malaysia.20 The use of 
public interest litigation was initially endorsed and supported by the Malaysian 
judiciary21 until the landmark decision in Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit 
                                                 
17 See Andrew Harding and Connie Carter, “The Singapore Model of Law and Development: 
Cutting Through the Complexity” in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds.), Law and 
Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003) at pp. 
193-194; Eugene Tan, “’We’ and ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore” (2002) 4(1) The 
Australian Journal of Asian Law 1 (on the conservative approach of the Singapore judiciary 
towards the adjudication of fundamental constitutional rights of individuals). 
18 A detailed study of the practical implementation efforts of the Singapore judiciary to enhance 
access to justice is outside the constraints of this paper. The interested reader may wish to refer to, 
for example, Karen Blochlinger, “Primus Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among 
Equals?” (2000) 9(3) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 591; Richard Magnus, “The Confluence 
of Law and Policy in Leveraging Technology: Singapore Judiciary’s Experience” (2004) 12 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 661; Lim Lan Yuan & Liew Thiam Leng, Court Mediation 
in Singapore (FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, 1997). 
19  E.g. Ross Worthington, “Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the 
Contemporary Judiciary in Singapore” (2001) 18(4) Journal of Law and Society 490 (note that the 
assumptions and conclusions made in the article have been rejected by the High Court in the 
recent case of Attorney-General v. Chee Soon Juan [2006] SGHC 54 at para. 50); with respect to 
the present emphasis on efficiency and speed in the Singapore judiciary, one senior lawyer was 
quoted as stating that “[j]ustice delayed may be justice denied. But justice hurried is justice buried. 
You can’t expect cuisine quality under fast food conditions”, in “Singapore Lawyers – Up close 
with ‘a most naughty profession’”, The Straits Times (13 February 2006). 
20 See Roger Tan, “The Role of Public Interest Litigation In Promoting Good Governance in 
Malaysia and Singapore”. Online: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my. 
21 E.g. Lim Cho Hock v. Government of the State of Perak [1980] 2 MLJ 148; Tan Sri Othman 
Saat v. Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] 2 MLJ 177. 
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 Siang22 which has resulted, unfortunately, in the tightening of the locus standi 
rules. 23  In this regard, we note that Indian courts have placed even greater 
emphasis on public interest litigation, including epistolary jurisdiction via “writ 
petitions and even letters from public-spirited individuals”24 accompanied by the 
relaxation of locus standi rules to enhance access to justice for the poor. 25 
Nonetheless, these measures implemented to expand access to justice for the poor 
in India have not escaped criticism either.26  
A strong rights-based and constitutional jurisprudence adopted by the 
courts is not necessarily correlated with a conscientious practice or 
implementation of access to justice. A pro-active judiciary in the implementation 
of access to justice programmes in a particular jurisdiction may, for instance, be 
associated with a relatively weak constitutional jurisprudence on the right of 
access to justice. It is argued that the practice and implementation efforts to 
enhance access to justice should, in the long term, be informed and undergirded 
by a well-considered notion of rights and constitutionalism.  If the right of access 
to justice is absent or not recognised and protected by the legal system, it is 
possible that beneficial access to justice programmes may one day be terminated 
or ceased without being amenable to a formal and legal challenge by the 
aggrieved parties or beneficiaries. The discipline of law is not merely about the 
practice and application of legal principles to resolve litigants’ problems (which 
are clearly important in themselves), but is also concerned with the underlying 
and foundational issues about the nature of legal rights and obligations. The latter 
is the focus of this paper – that is, judicial discourse on the right of access to 
                                                 
22  [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (see, however, the powerful dissenting judgments of Seah S. CJ and 
Abdoolcader S. CJ); compare the Singapore position in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for 
Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609 (which appears to endorse more liberal locus standi 
rules in the context of a challenge against a ministerial order based on constitutional provisions 
which seek to protect the right to profess, practice and propagate religion). See also the recent 
Malaysian decision of Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Raja Segaran a/l Krishnan [2005] 1 MLJ 15 in 
which locus standi was established. 
23 Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar v. Kajing Tubek [1997] 3 MLJ 23. 
24 See SP Gupta v. President of India (1982) SC 149 at 189 (Bhagwati J.); Bandhu Mukti Morcha 
v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 at 814 (Bhagwati J.). 
25 See e.g. PP Craig and SL Deshpande, “Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation 
in India” (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 356; Susan D. Susman, “Distant Voices In The 
Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 57. 
26 See e.g. Mark Galanter and Jayanth K Krishnan, ““Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and 
the Rights of the Needy in India” (2003-2004) 55 Hastings Law Journal 789 (critiquing the 
“judicially orchestrated public interest litigation” and the Lok Adalats or “peoples’ courts” in 
India); Jamie Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?” (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 495; Shubhanker Dam, “Vineet 
Narain v. Union of India: “A court of law and not of justice” – is the Indian Supreme Court 
beyond the Indian Constitution” [2005] Public Law 239. 
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 justice as gleaned from case law as well as extra-bench statements and 
pronouncements. 
 
II. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE –  
ITS NATURE AND SCOPE 
 
The important issues raised in this Section II relate to the nature and scope of the 
right of access to justice. In sub-section A, we explore, via an examination of 
judicial discourse in Singapore and Malaysia, whether the right of access to 
justice is a fundamental right enshrined in the constitution or a common law right 
which may be overridden by legislation. The extent by which such a right may be 
qualified by socio-economic imperatives will also be briefly discussed. Sub-
section B explores a set of associated rights and issues vital to enhancing access to 
lawyers’ assistance and services, namely the right to legal representation and 
counsel as well as the issues relating to legal aid and contingency fees. In this 
section, the author will also make references to the English position insofar as 
they impinge upon the Singapore and Malaysian judicial approaches. Section III 
concludes the paper. 
Before we embark on the constitutional debate on access to justice in sub-
section A, it is appropriate to consider the statements and pronouncements by 
Singapore and Malaysian judges which, collectively, reflect the great importance 
attached to access to justice. A few examples would suffice here as the general 
notion of access to justice as an important asset to the discipline of law is fairly 
uncontroversial (though the constitutional status and extent of that right may be 
contested).  
In the Singapore case of Amar Hoseen Mohammed v. Singapore Airlines 
Ltd,27  for instance, the learned Judicial Commissioner observed, in the context of 
a security for costs application, that “courts are slow to whittle away a natural 
person’s right to litigate despite poverty. The requirement for security for costs 
from a foreigner, a natural person, making on the face of things a genuine claim 
against a large airline must not appear to deny him access to our courts”.28  
In the subsequent decision in Pandian Marmuthu v. Guan Leong,29 the 
Singapore High Court, again with respect to an application for security for costs, 
emphasised that the court should be circumspect in ensuring that the defendant’s 
purpose of seeking security for costs does not quell the plaintiff’s quest for justice. 
The Malaysian court in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v. Lorrain Esme 
                                                 
27 [1995] 1 SLR 77. 
28 [1995] 1 SLR 77 at 84 (emphasis added).  
29 [2001] 3 SLR 400 at 403. 
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 Osman,30 in allowing the defendant to take a specific amount of monies from his 
assets held under a Mareva injunction for certain legal proceedings abroad, was 
concerned not to deny him access to justice in those proceedings which involved 
the defendant’s “personal liberty”. In effect, the court was stating an important 
principle that the defendant’s access to justice, albeit in foreign courts, should not 
be denied due to his financial condition. 
The Singapore Judiciary has also made significant pronouncements, 
outside of the courtrooms, on the need for access to justice. In his address at the 
4th Workplan for Subordinate Courts in 1995/1996, the former Chief Justice of 
Singapore asked: “What then are the Subordinate Courts’ values? The first must 
surely be accessibility…”.31 The former Chief Justice has, in his speech to the 
Subordinate Courts which handle 95% of the court cases in Singapore, stated that 
“the Judiciary must guard against the obstruction to justice, or more accurately, 
access to justice. We must strive to ensure that the public, and especially those 
who are indigent, can seek the redress available through the judicial process”.32  
In the most recent Subordinate Courts Workplan 2006/2007, the present 
Chief Justice of Singapore has continued to stress the significance of access to 
justice.33 The emphasis on access to justice as one of two main objectives and 
“accessibility” as a significant “value” in the Singapore subordinate courts has 
also been reflected in their Justice Statement.34 It was reported that the Kuala 
Lumpur High Court Judge Justice Abdul Aziz Mohamad has in 2002 specifically 
raised the problem of access to justice for the poor and vulnerable sectors in 
Malaysian society.35  
 
                                                 
30 [1990] 3 MLJ 481. For related proceedings, see Lorraine Esme Osman v. Attorney-General of 
Malaysia [1986] 2 MLJ 288 (the validity of Order 66 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on 
obtaining evidence in Malaysia for foreign courts in criminal proceedings and examinations 
carried out pursuant to the Order); Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v. Lorrain Esme Osman [1986] 
1 MLJ 426 (substituted service of writ); Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v. Lorrain Esme Osman 
[1987] 2 MLJ 633 (dismissal of application for striking out of action and/or stay of Malaysian 
proceedings and the issue of the applicable substantive law). 
31 LY Lim and TL Liew, supra note 18 at p. 21 (emphasis added). 
32 “Anchoring Justice’, Subordinate Courts”, 12th Workplan 2003/2004 (emphasis added). 
33 The Chief Justice said that “[m]ore than ever, it is important for the Subordinate Courts to 
entrench the rule of law, enhance access to justice and deepen public trust and confidence in its 
work”: see Keynote Address by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, “Justice @ 
The Subordinate Courts: The New Phases of Justice”, 15th Subordinate Courts Workplan 
2006/2007 (18 May 2006). 
34  This statement details the mission, objectives, goals, justice models and values of the 
subordinate judiciary. The full text of the Singapore Subordinate Courts’ Justice Statement is 
found online: http://www.subcourts.gov.sg.  
35 The Star (9 February 2002). 
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 A. Judicial Discourse on the Constitutional Status of the Right of Access 
to Justice 
 
The way I want to see thought reformed is by our ceasing to view the elimination 
of poverty as a sentimental matter, as  a matter of compassion, and our starting to 
look on it as a matter of justice, of constitutional right. (Charles L Black Jr)36 
 
Cappelletti has observed the growing trend of the “constitutionalisation of access 
to justice” exemplified in modern constitutions which include “social rights”, of 
which Cappelletti regards access as the “essential core and the basic raison 
d’etre”.37 Does this trend apply to Singapore and Malaysia?  
In this sub-section A, we will examine two sets of Malaysian cases (or 
judicial episodes) in sub-sections A (i) and (ii) respectively on the issue of 
whether access to justice is a right enshrined in the constitution or merely a 
common law right. Both cases deal primarily with access to the court and judicial 
remedies, constitutional challenges to administrative decision-making and 
parliamentary law-making and the audi alteram partem rule. As the Singapore 
courts have not explicitly examined the question of the constitutional right of 
access to justice, the author will endeavour in sub-section A (iii) below to provide 
tentative predictions of the likely responses and perceptions of the Singapore 
judiciary to the Malaysian judicial discourse as well as the challenges for the 
future. 
 
1. The Sugumar Balakrishnan Episode and the Singapore Experience on 
Statutory Ouster of Judicial Review 
 
The Malaysian case of Sugumar Balakrishnan v. Pengarah Imigresen Negeri 
Sabah38 concerned the decision of the Sabah immigration authority to cancel the 
entry permit of the appellant to reside in the state of Sabah, Malaysia. The 
appellant subsequently sought a judicial review of the administrative decision of 
the immigration authority via certiorari. The Malaysian Court of Appeal held that 
the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 5(1)39 of the Federal Constitution 
included the liberty of an aggrieved person to seek relief in court (that is, via the 
                                                 
36 Charles L. Black Jr., “Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood”, Address 
Before the Columbia University Law School, 20 March 1986, in 86 Columbia Law Review 1103 at 
1115 (1986). 
37 Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 3 at p. 36. 
38 [1998] 3 MLJ 289. 
39 It reads: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with the 
law”. 
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 judicial review of administrative action). Thus, a statutory provision40 ousting the 
power of judicial review would be inconsistent with this fundamental liberty of 
access to the judiciary. It was held that statutory ouster clauses shall only apply in 
a limited sense to those administrative acts and decisions not infected by an error 
of law. In addition, Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. determined that an administrative 
decision may be reviewed on the grounds of substantive fairness (i.e. the decision 
must be “reasonable” and the punishment imposed should not be disproportionate 
to the alleged wrongdoing).41 
The Malaysian Court of Appeal noted that the constitutional right of a 
person to seek redress for wrongs is recognised in England (which does not have a 
written constitution). The English case of R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte 
Witham42 was cited by the Malaysian Court of Appeal for the legal proposition 
that the executive cannot abrogate the right of access to justice unless permitted 
specifically by the British Parliament. In the case of Malaysia which has a written 
constitution, the Malaysian Parliament is a fortiori not empowered to abrogate 
that right. Further, according to the Indian case of Sampath Kumar v. Union of 
India,43 judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution which 
no parliament can take away. 
However, the Malaysian Federal Court in Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. 
Sugumar Balakrishnan 44  subsequently reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeal. The Federal Court held that the constitutional rights under Article 5(1) of 
the Federal Constitution can be removed in accordance with law as constitutional 
rights are not absolute. In this respect, it should be noted that Malaysian courts 
have rejected the basic features doctrine.45 It was held that the effect of the ouster 
clause46 was clearly intended by the Parliament to remove judicial review.47 The 
                                                 
40 In this case, section 59A of the Malaysian Immigration Act 1963, which provides in wide terms 
that “(1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or any decision made by 
the Minister or the Director General, or in the case of an East Malaysian State, the State Authority, 
under this Act except in regard to a question relating to compliance with any procedural 
requirement of this Act or the regulations governing that act or decision.” 
41 For an endorsement of the independent ground of substantive fairness in judicial review, see 
Sudha CK G. Pillay, “The Emerging Doctrine of Substantive Fairness – A Permissible Challenge 
To The Exercise of Administrative Discretion?” [2001] 3 MLJ i. 
42 [1997] 2 All ER 779. 
43 AIR 1987 SC 386 at 388 (per Bhagwati C.J.), interpreting an earlier Indian decision in Minerva 
Mills Ltd v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR. 206; see also Kesavananda Bharati v The State of 
Kerala AIR (1973) SC 1461. India has a written constitution. 
44 [2002] 3 MLJ 72. 
45 See Phang Chin Hock@ Ah Tee v. PP [1980] 1 MLJ 70; Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of 
Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187. 
46 Section 59A of the Malaysian Immigration Act 1963. 
47  See S. Kulasingam v. Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory [1982] 1 MLJ 204; 
Government of Malaysia v. Selangor Pilot Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133. 
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 Federal Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeal that the doctrine of 
substantive fairness, described as “new amorphous and wide-ranging”, is an 
appropriate ground for judicial review of administrative decision. Thus, the right 
of access to justice cannot be sustained in the face of an express statutory ouster 
of judicial review. 
The Singapore case of Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs,48 
which represents the high watermark of judicial activism underlaid by strong legal 
principles, is also concerned with a statutory ouster of judicial review. The 
Singapore Court of Appeal adopted an objective test (that is, requiring the 
existence of objective grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural 
impropriety)49 in the judicial review of ministerial discretion in issuing preventive 
detention orders under the Internal Security Act.50 Upon a comprehensive survey 
of English and Commonwealth precedents, the court decided to depart from the 
then prevailing subjective test applicable in both Singapore and Malaysia. 
Importantly, the subjective test was rejected on the grounds that arbitrary 
detention would run foul of Article 12 of the Singapore Constitution (on equal 
protection of the law)51 and against the hallowed rule of law.52 As evidence of a 
balanced and principled approach, the Court of Appeal was careful to state that 
the courts would only look at the existence of national security considerations, but 
would not question the Executive on the requirements thereof. 
However, the Singapore Parliament subsequently reversed the Chng 
position by adopting a subjective test and expressly excluding judicial review via 
constitutional and statutory amendments.53 Faced with a new ouster clause which 
was clear and unambiguous, the Court of Appeal in Teo Soh Lung v. Minister of 
Home Affairs 54  confirmed the exclusion of judicial review under the new 
legislative amendments, similar to the Federal Court’s position in Sugumar. 
Doubts were also cast on the applicability of the Indian basic features doctrine in 
Singapore.55 In this manner, the judges’ role in ensuring the right of access to 
                                                 
48 [1988] SLR 132 (Wee Chong Jin CJ, LP Thean and Chan Sek Keong JJ.). 
49 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services [1985] AC 374. 
50 Cap. 143, ss. 8 and 10. The objective test has also been applied in Malaysia: see Mohamad 
Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (on the decision of police officers 
to arrest and detain under section 73 of the ISA). 
51 [1988] SLR 132 at 155. 
52 [1988] SLR 132 at 156. 
53 Acts No. 1 & 2 of 1989. The new section 8 B(2) of the I.S.A. provides that “[t]here shall be no 
judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by the President or the Minister 
under the provisions of this Act save in regard to any question relating to compliance with any 
procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision”; section 8B (1) confirmed that 
the subjective test encapsulated in the old case of Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs 
[1969-71] SLR 508 shall, henceforth, be the applicable test. 
54 [1990] 2 MLJ 129. 
55 Cheng Vincent v. Minister of Home Affairs [1990] SLR 190 at 202. 
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 justice for the individual has thus been severely limited by Parliamentary fiat, 
despite the principled restraint exhibited by the Singapore Court of Appeal in 
Chng against scrutinising the requirements of national security considerations. 
 
2. The Kekatong case and the Danaharta Act 
 
The next set of Malaysian cases articulated in greater detail the right of access to 
justice. They involved the non-availability of judicial remedies (injunctions) 
against the Malaysian national asset company, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional 
Berhad (“Danaharta”) in the wake of the Asian economic crisis pursuant to the 
Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 (“Danaharta Act”). The salient 
facts are as follows: a bank lent monies to a borrower and in order to secure the 
loan, the plaintiff created a third party charge over certain pieces of land in favour 
of the bank. The borrower defaulted on the payment and judgment was obtained 
against the borrower. The bank subsequently issued the plaintiff a fresh notice 
demanding payment56 for the sum owing by the borrower to the bank. Whilst the 
loan remained unpaid, the Danaharta Act came into force. As a result, the loan 
and charge, under which rights and remedies originally vested in the bank, 
became vested in Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd (the wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Danaharta) via the Danaharta Act.  
  The plaintiff’s application for an interlocutory injunction against the 
defendant to restrain the latter from selling the charged land was dismissed by the 
High Court. The High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction 
under section 7257 of the Danaharta Act. Essentially, section 72 bars a court from 
making an order to stay, restrain or affect the powers and actions of Danaharta. 
The ambit of the provision is indeed very wide. 58  It applies not merely to 
                                                 
56 That is, Form 16D notice under the Malaysian National Land Code 1965. 
57 Section 72 reads:  
“Notwithstanding any law, an order of a court cannot be granted – 
(a) which stays, restrains or affects the powers of the Corporation, Oversight Committee, 
Special Administrator or Independent Advisor under this Act; 
(b) which stays, restrains or affects any action taken, or proposed to be taken, by the 
Corporation, Oversight Committee, Special Administrator or Independent Advisor under 
this Act; 
(c) which compels the Corporation, Oversight Committee, Special Administrator or 
Independent Adviser to do or perform any act, 
and any such order, if granted, shall be void and unenforceable and shall not be the subject of any 
process of execution whether for the purpose of compelling obedience of the order or otherwise.”  
The term “Corporation” above means Danaharta (s. 2). 
58 It has been referred as a “God-provision” which “allows Danaharta to do anything it likes, no 
matter how illegal, unfair or malicious it is”: see Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Fahri Azzat Amer 
Hamzah and Edmund Bon, “The God-provision”. Online: 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/1357/27 (18 May 2005). 
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 Danaharta, but a whole host of other entities mentioned in section 72.59 Apart 
from injunctions, it could also apply to orders for mandamus and certiorari.60 The 
width and applicability of section 72 throws into greater relief the issue of its 
constitutionality. 
 
(i) The Malaysian Court of Appeal’s decision 
 
On appeal, the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta 
Urus Sdn Bhd61 reversed the High Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal ruled 
that section 72 was unconstitutional as it violated article 8(1)62 of the Federal 
Constitution. What is significant for our present purposes is the Court of Appeal’s 
detailed examination of the right of access to justice in the Federal Constitution. 
In this regard, Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. ruled that the definition of “law” in the 
Federal Constitution is “not exhaustive”, but “open ended” by reference, inter alia, 
to Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution.63 The learned judge said that – 
 
[i]t therefore refers to a system of law that is fair and just. In our judgment, art 
8(1) is a codification of Dicey’s rule of law. Article 8(1) emphasises that this is a 
country where Government is according to the rule of law. In other words, there 
must be fairness of State action of any sort, legislative, executive or judicial. In 
simple terms, no one is above the law…64 
 
Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. also quoted at length the English decision in Pierson v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department65 to support the proposition that 
Parliament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law and that 
the rule of law embodies minimum standards of fairness, both substantive and 
procedural. Citing the Singapore Privy Council decision in Ong Ah Chuan v. 
Public Prosecutor, 66  the learned judge ruled that the system of rule of law 
                                                 
59 For example, the special administrators: see section 39 of the Danaharta Act and the case of 
Wong Koon Seng v. Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 98 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur). 
60 See Wong Koon Seng v. Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 98. 
61 [2003] 3 MLJ 1.  
62 Article 8(1) reads: “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of 
the law”. 
63 Article 160(2) reads: “Law includes written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation 
in the Federation or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having the force of law in the 
Federation or any part thereof”. 
64 [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 15. 
65 [1988] AC 539 at 591 (House of Lords). The “rule of law” in Pierson was that a sentence 
lawfully passed should not be increased retrospectively. 
66 [1981] 1 MLJ 64.  
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 incorporates the fundamental principles of natural justice67 of the common law 
and that “one of the fundamental principles of the common law is access to 
justice”. His Honour observed that this proposition is substantiated by the English 
decisions of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech68 
and R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham.69  
As in the Sugumar case, it is important to note the Malaysian judicial 
approach concerning the material difference between the notions of parliamentary 
sovereignty in England and constitutional supremacy in Malaysia. Whilst the 
English parliament can restrict access to justice (albeit in a rare case)70 on the 
basis of the British unwritten constitution, Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. noted that the 
Federal Constitution (including the right of access to justice in Article 8(1)) is the 
supreme law in Malaysia.71 Thus, ordinary legislation in Malaysia (such as the 
Danaharta Act) must clear the constitutional hurdle of fairness embodied in 
Article 8. Clearly, the Malaysian Court of Appeal’s approach to access to justice 
is consonant with constitutionalism and a broad rights-based jurisprudence.  
Both the English decisions cited by Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. contain explicit 
statements of the constitutional status of the right of access to justice derived, as it 
were, from common law.72 It should be pointed out that the Witham case was 
specifically related to cost-based access to justice. Pursuant to his power to 
increase court fees under section 130 of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981, the 
Lord Chancellor issued new regulations 73  which excluded provisions for 
exemption from and remission of fees for non-legally aided persons.  Upon an 
application for judicial review by a litigant in person, the new regulations were 
                                                 
67 As to the debate whether the concept of natural justice is both procedural and substantive or 
merely procedural, see Andrew Harding, “Natural Justice And The Constitution” (1981) 23 
Malaya Law Review 226; and TKK Iyer, “Article 9(1) And “Fundamental Principles of Natural 
Justice” In The Constitution of Singapore” (1981) 23 Malaya Law Review 213. 
68 [1994] QB 198. 
69 [1997] 2 All ER 779. 
70 See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198 at 212. 
71 Note, however, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 
115 at 131 (Lord Hoffman) (“In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though 
acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different 
from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document.”) 
72 See TRS Allan, “Constitutional Rights and Common Law” (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 453 (that rights at common law have a ‘constitutional’ dimension in the UK context and 
cited at 455 Lord Diplock’s statement in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 at 
310 as supporting a fundamental right of access to justice to the courts). 
73 Article 3 of the Supreme Court Fees (Amendment) Order 1996. 
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 adjudged to be ultra vires on the grounds that the effect was to deny the applicant 
his constitutional right of access to justice.74  
Thus, prior to the enactment of the UK Human Rights Act, the common 
law right of access to justice had already possessed the constitutional stamp of 
authority.75 The English position is that legislation may override the constitutional 
rights derived from common law in only two ways, by necessary implication76 or 
by express provision77 respectively.78 With respect to the exclusion of the right of 
access to justice in Malaysia, however, one further point needs to be noted. As 
stated by Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A., the fundamental right of access to justice in 
Malaysia, as an integral part of Article 8 of the Federal Constitution, should be 
liberally and broadly construed.79 
 
(ii) The Federal Court’s decision – an analysis and critique 
 
In overruling the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Malaysian Federal Court in 
Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v. Kekatong Sdn Bhd80 contended that the common law 
right of access to justice “cannot amount to a guaranteed fundamental right”.81 
The common law is qualified and not absolute.82 Unlike the Court of Appeal, the 
Federal Court focused on the definition of “law” in Article 160(2) of the Federal 
Constitution which includes “the common law in so far as it is in operation in the 
Federation”. Hence, Article 160(2) refers to the law which has already brought 
into operation the common law of the Federation. In this regard, the Federal Court 
also referred to section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 which provides that, 
except as otherwise provided in other written law, the Malaysian courts shall 
apply the common law of England and the rules of equity as administered in 
England as of 7 April 1956 (in respect of West Malaysia) subject to local 
circumstances. According to the Federal Court, this meant that the common law 
                                                 
74 The former exemptions and remissions were subsequently reinstated. See Rosalind English, 
“Wrongfooting the Lord Chancellor: Access to Justice in the High Court” (1998) 61 Modern Law 
Review 245 at 253. 
75 In the very recent House of Lords’ decision of Watkins v. Home Office [2006] UKHL 17 at 
paras. 24, 58 and 59, the constitutional right of access to the court, in particular the right to obtain 
confidential legal correspondence, was endorsed (in the context of a claim under the tort of 
misfeasance in public office). 
76 Ex parte Leech [1994] QB at 198. 
77 Ex parte Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779; Watkins v. Home Office [2006] UKHL 17 at para. 59 
(Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). 
78 See Raymond v. Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 at 13. 
79 [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 19. 
80 [2004] 2 MLJ at 257. 
81 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 17; applied in Harmenderpall Singh a/l Jagara Singh v. Public 
Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ at 542. 
82 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 17. 
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 could be modified after 7 April 1956 by written law.83 Thus, the right of access to 
justice is one that can be modified by written law (in this case, the Danaharta Act).  
The Federal Court also placed emphasis on Article 121(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. This provision states that the High Court shall have such jurisdiction 
and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law. The Federal Court began 
by quoting Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulken Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. 
South India Shipping Corp84 that every citizen should have a “constitutional right 
of access” to the courts of justice to obtain remedies.  
However, the Federal Court referred, in the next breath, to access to 
justice under Article 8(1) as a “general right”, 85  in contrast to the Court of 
Appeal’s treatment of access to justice as a fundamental liberty under the 
Constitution.  Whilst the Federal Court stated that Articles 8(1) and 121(1) 
“complement” each other, it was of the view that Article 121 on the jurisdiction 
and powers of the court is “clearly the dominant element which determines the 
boundaries of access to justice”.86 Thus, “access to justice shall be available only 
to the extent that the courts are empowered to administer justice”.87  
The Federal Court proceeded to add that “[t]he right is determined by the 
justiciability of the matter. If a matter is not justiciable, there is no right to access 
to justice in respect of that matter. Thus, Parliament can enact a federal law 
pursuant to the authority conferred by art 121(1) to remove or restrict the 
jurisdiction and power of the court”. This expansive interpretation of 
Parliamentary law-making in derogation of judicial power has been applied in 
subsequent Malaysian cases.88 
The decision of the Federal Court has been subject to fairly strident 
criticism. 89  One criticism is that the Federal Court failed to appreciate the 
difference between a law enacted by Parliament pursuant to powers given under a 
                                                 
83  [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 14. See also the recent decision of Abdul Hamid Mohamad 
F.C.J. ]rifin Zakaria F.C.J. concurring) in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v. Steven Phoa 
Cheng Loon [2006] 2 MLJ 389 at paras. 39-50, in particular para. 42 on the approach of the 
Malaysian courts under section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 in first ascertaining the written law in 
force in Malaysia when faced with the issue of determining whether a particular common law 
principle (in this case, a tort law principle) applies. 
84 [1981] 1 All ER 289. 
85 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26. 
86 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26. 
87 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26. 
88 E.g. Ahmad Yani bin Ismail v. Inspector General of Police [2005] 4 MLJ at 636 (Malaysian 
High Court). 
89 See Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Fahri Azzat Amer Hamzah and Edmund Bon, supra note 58 (“By 
affirming the constitutionality of section 72 of the Danaharta Act, the Judiciary also affirmed its 
impotence.”) 
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 Constitution and the constitutional provisions themselves. 90  Abdul Kader, for 
instance, argued that “[t]he right to justice embodied in art. 8 (1), although of 
common law origin, is not dependent on it. The right flows from the Constitution 
itself, which is sui generis.”91  
In similar fashion, Naidu submitted that the Federal Court’s decision 
implied (incorrectly) that the Constitution must be read to accommodate a mere 
statutory provision (that is, section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956), instead of the 
other way round.92 Moreover, it can be argued that the Federal Court had wrongly 
equated the existence of a fundamental right with the jurisdiction and power of 
the courts to exercise that right pursuant to article 121 of the Constitution. A 
fundamental right does not become a general right merely because the courts are 
not able to exercise that right (pursuant to article 121).93   
Regardless of the 1988 amendments to Article 121 which removed the 
words “vesting” and “judicial power” from the old provision,94 it is suggested that 
judicial power is nevertheless retained in the Malaysian courts.95  It has been 
argued that the 1988 amendments did not expressly exclude the exercise of 
judicial power. Further, and more importantly, if judicial power is not 
constitutionally protected in Article 121, it would naturally tempt the legislature 
to ride roughshod over the judiciary with respect to the latter’s control over 
inferior courts and administrative bodies with catastrophic consequences.96 Hence, 
the reasons underlying the Federal Court’s decision are not persuasive. 
 
(iii) The Rational Nexus and Balancing Economic and Public Interests 
 
The Court of Appeal held that section 72 of the Danaharta Act is contrary to the 
rule of law in Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution as it failed to meet the 
minimum standards of fairness in the substantive and procedural sense. This is 
                                                 
90  Mohideen Abdul Kader, “Access to Justice”. Online: http://www.malaysiabar.org.my (16 
November 2005). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Jayanthi Naidu, “The Rise and Rise of Administrative Finality” [2004] 2 MLJ lxxii. 
93 Ibid. 
94 The amendments to Article 121 in 1988 were prompted by the Malaysian decision in Public 
Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ at 311. The court in that case held that section 418A 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowered the Public Prosecutor to issue a certificate 
requiring the Subordinate Courts to remove or transfer a pending criminal case to the High Court, 
was unconstitutional as it amounted to an interference with “judicial power” under the old Article 
121(1) of the Federal Constitution.  
95 See The Queen v. Liyanage (1967) AC 259; (1966) 1 All ER 650; Hinds v. The Queen [1977] 
AC 195; Kok Wah Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan [2004] 5 MLJ 193 
at para. 52. 
96 Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal 
Sdn Bhd, 1996) at 136. 
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 because section 72 denies the plaintiff the right to seek injunctive relief against 
the second defendant “under any circumstances, including circumstances in which 
the Act may not apply”.97 The Court of Appeal also indicated that the denial of 
injunctive relief under the Danaharta Act only operates against the plaintiff, and 
not Danaharta. Moreover, it was of the view that parliamentary intention as to the 
purpose of the Act was not relevant to the issue of constitutionality. 
The Federal Court disagreed with the above approach of the Court of 
Appeal. First, the Federal Court reminded us that “equality does not mean 
absolute equality of all men”. 98  The Federal Court relied on the doctrine of 
reasonable classification to determine whether a particular law applies to all 
persons who are similarly circumstanced. In this regard, the Federal Court 
referred to numerous Indian99 and Malaysian100 court decisions in support. With 
respect to section 72, the Federal Court stated that the purpose of that section (i.e. 
to promote revitalisation of the nation’s economy in the public interest) applies to 
all persons in the same position as Kekatong (plaintiff) whose assets and liabilities 
have been acquired by Danaharta. The Federal Court correctly opined that 
“[s]urely, it cannot include the [defendant] [Danaharta] itself for reasons which 
are too plain to state” as Danaharta would be outside the category of persons in 
similar circumstances as the plaintiff. 101  As a rational nexus exists, the 
constitutionality of section 72 was preserved. 
The Federal Court cited Bhagwati J. in RK Garg v. Union of India102 that 
the judiciary should defer to legislative judgment in the field of economic 
regulation. Contrary to the Court of Appeal, the Federal Court opined that the 
purpose of the Act is important in determining the constitutionality of section 72. 
In this respect, the Federal Court took into consideration the Asian economic 
crisis which affected the Malaysian Ringgit, falling share prices and the rise of 
non-performing loans.103 The parliamentary intention in enacting the Danaharta 
Act was to permit Danaharta to acquire the non-performing loans so as to 
alleviate the financial pressure on banks and financial institutions.104  
 
                                                 
97 [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 22. 
98 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 31. 
99 E.g. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S R Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538; Charanjit Lal v. 
Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; State of WB v. Anwar Ali AIR 1952 SC 75. 
100 E.g. Datuk Haji Harun bin Hj Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155; Abdul Ghani bin 
Ali@ Ahmad & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 561 (Federal Court of Malaysia). 
101 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 59. 
102 AIR 1981 SC 2138. 
103 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 54. 
104 See Franky Construction Sdn Bhd v. MEC Industrial Park Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 212 (High 
Court, Kuantan). 
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 Apart from the acquisition of such non-performing loans, Danaharta was 
also responsible for managing the acquired assets and proper disposal via the 
special administrators appointed under the Act. Hence, if injunctive relief were 
allowed against Danaharta from selling the charged lands, the Federal Court was 
of the view that it could substantially delay the completion of the sales and thus 
adversely affect the creditors of the corporate borrowers.105  According to the 
Federal Court, it was important to deny injunctive relief under section 72 to fulfil 
the objectives of the Danaharta Act.  In the final analysis, access to justice for the 
debtors as against Danaharta was denied and overridden by macro-economic and 
public interest considerations.106 
Whilst the rationale and purpose of the Danaharta Act as described by the 
Federal Court above are in themselves relevant factors for purposes of the 
doctrine of reasonable classification, it is argued that there are other more 
appropriate (and, the present author would add, sophisticated) methods of 
balancing the right of access of justice with the need to promote economic and 
public interests. The ground of administrative efficiency cited by the Federal 
Court should be subject to further court scrutiny.  
Naidu stated, for example, that “mere efficiency cannot become the be all 
and end all of administrative process”. 107 The intensity of court scrutiny will, 
according to Naidu, depend on the seriousness of the impact on individuals, 
interests of the decision-makers, nature of the administrative body subject to 
review and the decision-making, appeal and review structure.108  
In the final analysis, however, Naidu was of the view that the intensity of 
court scrutiny should be low in respect of the case in question. She took into 
consideration the fact that “[a]t all times, the loan was a non-performing one and 
the real reason for the Respondent to file the injunction is not clear”.109 Thus, she 
agreed with the Federal Court’s decision that the appeal should be allowed, albeit 
via “a different route”. The present author would also add that there may be 
                                                 
105 [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 57. 
106 See also Tan Sri Dato Tajuddin Ramli v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd [2002] 5 MLJ 
720 on the constitutionality of section 72 with respect to Article 5(1) and 13(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. The Malaysian High Court observed that the Danaharta Act is a “social legislation” 
necessitated by the Asian economic crisis and “expressly legislated for the singular purpose of 
saving the economy from collapse.” Further, section 72 was “an essential provision necessary for 
the achievement of its expressed objective” and that the provision served to counter the tendency 
of the litigants in present-day Malaysia to press for injunctive reliefs. 
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 alternatives to resolve issues of administrative delay, an issue which the plaintiff 
could have raised or which the Federal Court could have examined.110 
In retrospect, the Federal Court could also have taken into account the 
particular impact on the litigants should the interlocutory injunction not be 
granted. Where the injunction is not granted, the respondent risks losing his 
immovable property permanently whilst if an interlocutory injunction is granted, 
there is only a temporary restraint (or postponement) of the appellant’s rights to 
the property until the issue is determined at trial.111 In this regard, we observe that 
Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. in Kekatong was at pains to distinguish the effect of 
interlocutory and permanent injunctions.112  
In addition, other measures could have been undertaken by the legislature 
to delineate and limit the scope of powers conferred on Danaharta. One example 
of such a measure is that Danaharta or the Danaharta Act could have a limited life 
span.113 The courts could also state that injunctions may be barred only if certain 
criteria which are in line with advancing the purposes of the Danaharta Act (such 
as a specific economic purpose implied from the Danaharta Act and the non-
discriminatory action of Danaharta in exercising its powers) were met. This 
means that the court should examine whether the criteria are satisfied in a 
particular case.114 In this regard, it is argued that the bar against injunctive relief 
in section 72 should be applicable only to the extent that the actions and powers 
exercised by Danaharta are not inconsistent with the purposes of the Danaharta 
Act.115   
 
                                                 
110 The problem of delays could, subject to costs reasons, be resolved by setting up special courts 
to deal expeditiously with issues arising from the implementation of the Danaharta Act; see for 
example, the special debt recovery tribunals pursuant to the Indian Recovery of Debt Due to 
Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, though it is recognised that the objectives of the 
respective legislation are not entirely the same. 
111 See Jayanthi Naidu, supra note 92; see also Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Kekatong [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 
22. 
112 The learned judge also ruled that Malaysian case precedents concerning the constitutionality of 
section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act and section 54(d) of the Specific Relief Act which 
provide for protection from injunctive relief, were “directed at permanent injunctions and not 
temporary injunctions”; hence, those cases were not directly relevant to the present case.  
113 Danamodal, for instance, envisaged that it has a limited life span of five years and aimed to exit 
once it has satisfied the objectives of recapitalisation or if its exit will enhance the prospects of 
achieving its objectives. See “Danamodal Nasional Berhad – the Malaysian Approach to bank 
recapitalisation, revitalisation and restructuring”. Online: 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/images/en/danamodal/approach.pdf. 
114 For instance, whether the work of Danaharta was material to the revitalisation of the economy 
and the alternatives available which do not adversely affect access to justice. 
115 These measures, if adopted, will help to alleviate the concerns of the Malaysian Court of 
Appeal in Kekatong that the bar against injunctions in section 72 applies in all circumstances, 
“including circumstances in which the [Danaharta] Act may not apply”. 
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 It is recognised that firstly, the utilisation of such criteria may propel one 
into the controversial territory of excessive “judicial creativity”; and secondly, 
that courts should not be too quick to intervene in the legislative function.116 
Hence, it is argued that the suggested criteria should be limited to those which 
seek to achieve an appropriate balance – that is, to maintain and implement the 
intended purposes of the Danaharta Act without rendering the right of access to 
justice a mere figment of the imagination. 
 
3. Possible Singapore Judicial Responses and Perspectives 
 
How would Singapore’s courts regard the right of access to justice from the 
constitutional perspective? What lessons can the Singapore judiciary draw from 
the Sugumar and Kekatong episodes? 
Whether Singapore’s courts would agree with the Malaysian Federal 
Court in Kekatong in treating the right of access to justice as a mere common law 
right or to adopt the robust constitutional approach of the Malaysian Court of 
Appeal in both Sugumar and Kekatong remains to be seen. What follows are 
tentative suggestions of the likely position of the Singapore judiciary based solely 
on the trend of constitutional rights interpretation thus far. It appears that the more 
liberal approach in the case of Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,117 which 
regarded the system of rule of law as incorporating the fundamental principles of 
natural justice of the common law, has subsequently given way in Singapore to a 
more utilitarian and pragmatic approach to rights.118 
Firstly, Singapore courts have tended to rely on the Malaysian courts’ 
constitutional interpretation, particularly where the provisions are identical or 
similar. Both Malaysia and Singapore adopt the Indian model insofar as 
fundamental rights provisions are concerned.119 Singapore’s shared constitutional 
history with Malaysia (or the “genealogical basis”) in the past has also contributed 
to the reliance on Malaysian decisions.120 Hence, it may be surmised from the 
                                                 
116 See e.g. Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] AC 484 (House of Lords) 
(the courts are slow to interfere with the housing authority’s administration of the UK Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act 1977) for purposes of deciding on the provision of accommodation for 
homeless persons). 
117 [1981] 1 MLJ 64; Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 2 MLJ 49 at 51; and Nguyen 
Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103. 
118  See Thio Li-Ann, ‘“Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication”: A Critical and 
Empirical Inquiry Into Singapore’s Engagement With International Human Rights Law”, (2004) 8 
SYBIL 41 at 56. 
119  Andrew Harding, “The ‘Westminster Model’ Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, 
Adaptation and Development in Commonwealth States” (2004) 4(2) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 143 at 164. 
120 See generally, Victor V. Ramraj, “‘Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore”, (2002) 6 
Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 302. 
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 above reasons that Singapore courts are likely to agree with the Federal Court of 
Malaysia in regarding the right of access to justice as merely a common law right 
which may be undercut by legislation. The historical background to the 
constitutional drafting may also suggest that access to justice was not intended to 
be a right within the Singapore constitutional framework, though this is not, by 
any means, conclusive.121 In this regard, it is noted that the 1966 Constitutional 
Commission’s recommendation to incorporate a right to judicial remedy in the 
constitution had been rejected.122 
There are, however, two subsequent events which may set the Singapore 
position apart from the Malaysian judicial discourse. The Application of English 
Law Act 1993123 in Singapore does not explicitly subject the common law to 
modification by subsequent written law, unlike section 3 of the Malaysian Civil 
Law Act 1956. It was the Federal Court’s interpretation of section 3 of the 
Malaysian Civil Law Act which resulted in the decision that the right of access to 
justice is modifiable by the Danaharta Act.124  
Further, Article 93125  of the Singapore Constitution on the vesting of 
judicial powers in the courts differs from the post-1988 Article 121 of the Federal 
Constitution which has removed the reference to “vesting” powers in the judiciary. 
According to the Federal Court in Kekatong, Article 121 on jurisdiction and 
powers of the court was allowed to determine the substantive scope of access to 
justice in Malaysia. Thus, in this regard, the Singapore judiciary would appear to 
be relatively less restricted in constitutional interpretation compared to its 
Malaysian counterpart.  
 
                                                 
121 For example, there is arguably an implied constitutional right to vote in Singapore, though this 
is not explicitly enumerated in the constitutional texts: see Thio Li-Ann, “Recent Constitutional 
Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and 
Wrongs” [2002] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 328 at 343.  
122 See Chapter II, 1966 Constitutional Commission Report, reproduced in Appendix D in Kevin 
Tan and Thio Li-Ann (eds.), Constitutional Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths, 1997) 
at p. 1022.  
123 Cap. 7A, 1994 Rev. Ed. Section 3 reads: “(1) The common law of England (including the 
principles and rules of equity), so far as it was part of the law of Singapore immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, shall continue to be part of the law of Singapore. 
(2)The common law shall continue to be in force in Singapore, as provided in subsection (1), so 
far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and subject to such 
modifications as those circumstances may require.” 
For a comprehensive discussion of the statute, see generally Andrew Phang, “Cementing the 
Foundations: The Singapore Application of English Law Act 1993” (1994) 28 University of 
British Columbia Law Review 205. 
124 Supra note 83. 
125 It reads: “The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such 
subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force”. 
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 Secondly, the Singapore judiciary has, at times, been somewhat reluctant 
to adopt a proactive stance against parliamentary legislation which allegedly 
infringe fundamental rights provisions in the Singapore Constitution. 126  The 
enactment of section 9A of the Singapore Interpretation Act127 signals a purposive 
approach to constitutional interpretation based on parliamentary materials in order 
to discern parliamentary intention.128 Constitutional adjudication of fundamental 
rights provisions in Singapore has been couched within largely communitarian 
and state-centric premises, instead of individualism and individual rights. 129 
Where the right of access to justice is pitted against legislative enactments which 
promote perceived community or state interests, the latter interests may be 
maintained or promoted at the expense of the right of access to justice. 
Thirdly, where the legislation in question is perceived as serving the 
purpose of economic development, particularly in the midst of a financial crisis, 
the Singapore judiciary is likely to endorse the enactment of legislation targeted at 
economic development. Based on past trends in constitutional adjudication, it 
would appear that fundamental rights in the constitution are likely to be accorded 
a lower priority compared to economic development objectives.130 This is also 
consistent with the Singapore government’s approach to governance which 
emphasises economic development over human rights.131 However, it must be 
said that Singapore has not passed legislation similar to the Danaharta Act, having 
                                                 
126  See e.g. the Singapore Court of Appeal’s statement in Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Public 
Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 617 at 631 (“Any law which provides for the deprivation of a person’s 
life or personal liberty, is valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by parliament. The court 
is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well.”) 
127 Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed. 
128 See Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 2 SLR 201. 
129 E.g. Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569; Chan 
Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609. This emphasis on 
communitarianism and state-centrism are also in sync with Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew) and 
Malaysian (Mahathir Mohamed) political leaders’ advocacy of Asian Values. 
130 Thio Li-Ann, supra note 118, at 43 (that human rights in Singapore is “ultimately informed by 
state objectives and national development goals prioritising economic growth and social order”); 
Eugene Tan, “Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way” (2000) 30(1) HKLJ 91 (on the 
dichotomous approach in Singapore towards commercial laws and individual rights respectively). 
131 The following quote from the Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs is instructive, particularly 
in the context of fundamental rights for the poor: 
…poverty makes a mockery of all civil liberties. Poverty is an obscene violation of the 
most basic of individual rights. Only those who have forgotten the pangs of hunger will 
think of consoling the hungry by telling them that they should be free before they can eat. 
Our experience is that economic growth is the necessary foundation of any system that 
claims to advance human dignity, and that order and stability are essential for 
development. 
See Wong Kan Seng, “The Real World of Human Rights”, Statement at the World Conference on 
Human Rights (Vienna, 16 June 1993). 
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 emerged relatively unscathed from the Asian economic crisis compared to her 
Southeast Asian neighbours.132 Hence, the question as to whether and how the 
Singapore courts would have reacted to such a constitutional challenge is, 
admittedly, purely hypothetical.    
What does the future portend for the constitutional status of the right of 
access to justice in Singapore? Will the spirit and ethos of Chng Suan Tze be 
resurrected? Or will a robust approach akin to Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. in Sugumar 
and Kekatong (even in the face of express legislative restrictions) be adopted to 
give the right of access to justice a firm constitutional “home”?  
Whilst the right of access to justice should be an integral part of the 
constitution, it is recognised that the constitutional right cannot be absolute, just 
as the Executive and Parliamentary powers must not remain unchecked. Such 
constitutional right of access to justice should be qualified by economic and 
public interests. In this balancing exercise, it is hoped that the courts would 
scrutinise any attempt at denying access to justice, whether via legislation or 
otherwise, with an eagle’s eye. This may involve, for example, the establishing of 
appropriate criteria (as suggested in my critique of the Federal Court’s decision in 
Kekatong) which the parliamentary legislation must fulfil before the right of 
access to justice may be ousted.  
The Singapore Judiciary has embarked on an exciting journey as it 
recently welcomed its new Chief Justice. 133  As an initial indication of his 
Honour’s approach to judicial administration, the recently appointed Chief Justice 
stated that, whilst court inefficiency and delays can result in increased costs and 
deprivation of property and civil rights, “[t]he fair administration of justice must 
ultimately trump court efficiency and convenience” in the event of a direct 
conflict.134  This perceived shift towards a more jurisprudential and “fairness-
based” approach to the administration of justice in Singapore is certainly timely 
and laudable, given that the practical problem of backlog of cases has been 
successfully resolved in the 1990s. It is hoped that this will be a useful platform 
upon which the Singapore judiciary can develop a more rights-based and 
jurisprudential approach towards the concept of access to justice.  
At the same time, the present author is humbly reminded of the legislative 
events which ensued following the Chng Suan Tze decision as mentioned in sub-
                                                 
132 Andrew Harding, “The Economic Crisis and Law Reform in South East Asia”, in Mhinder 
Bhopal and Michael Hitchcock (eds.), ASEAN Business in Crisis (Frank Cass: London, Portland, 
2002) at pp. 49-58. 
133 The Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong: see “Welcome Reference for the Chief 
Justice – Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong”. Online: 
http://www.supcourt.gov.sg (22 April 2006). 
134 See “Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice – Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice 
Chan Sek Keong”. Online: http://www.supcourt.gov.sg (22 April 2006) at paras. 11-13. 
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 section A (i) above. Thus, just as we expect our courts to be pro-active in 
respecting fundamental rights, the realisation of access to justice in particular 
cases ultimately depends on the joint efforts and contribution of all the organs of 
state and the legal profession.   
Before we leave this section on the constitutional status of the right of 
access to justice, let us briefly explore the question of the applicability of 
international and human rights in Malaysia and Singapore courts. At the 
international and regional level, there is some emphasis on access to justice as a 
human right though it falls short of recognition as a substantive legal right 
applicable within the domestic spheres of Singapore and Malaysia. Human rights 
may be categorised into (i) civil and political; and (ii) economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
With respect to civil and political rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains some related access to justice 
provisions.135 The UN Declaration of Human Rights also contains similar access 
to justice provisions.136 However, both the UN Declaration and ICCPR are not 
legally binding in both Malaysia and Singapore. The traditional position has been 
that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is not part of the domestic law of 
Singapore and Malaysia.137 Notwithstanding section 4(4) of the recently enacted 
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999138 which states that “regard 
shall be had” to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Federal Court in 
Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Police Negara 139  confirmed that 
Malaysian courts are not legally obliged to apply the abovementioned Declaration. 
In addition, Malaysia and Singapore are not signatories to the ICCPR.  
What about the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, 
particularly for the poor and vulnerable groups? At present, there are no socio-
economic rights contained in the Singapore and Malaysian constitutions. For 
                                                 
135 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that – 
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.” 
136 Article 8 – “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” 
Art 10 –“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge 
against him”. 
137 Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ at 356. 
138 The Act established the National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suruhanjaya Hak 
Asasi Manusia Malaysia) which is a national human rights institution to investigate human rights 
complaints or to review domestic law in line with international human rights instruments and 
standards. Singapore does not have such an institution. 
139 [2002] 4 MLJ at 449. 
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 similar reasons as above, the relevant socio-economic rights clauses in the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights140  and the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 141  are also not binding in 
Malaysia and Singapore. 
The Beijing Principles on the independence of the judiciary,142 signed by 
the former Chief Justices of Malaysia and Singapore respectively, contain 
important clauses which serve to promote access to justice. There are provisions, 
for example, which make reference to a person’s entitlement to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal (Article 2) and which 
seek to ensure the maintenance of the rule of law, observance and attainment of 
human rights and impartial administration of the law amongst persons and 
between persons and the State (Article 10). However, the Beijing Principles are 
not strictly speaking considered as customary rules legally binding on 
Singapore143 and Malaysia.144 
Malaysia and Singapore courts have in their judgments referred to the 
international human rights instruments and case law. However, the judges have 
generally not been persuaded by the ideas and tenets expressed in those 
international instruments and law, though it should be added that there are notable 
exceptions.145 This general position has been observed in various constitutional 
                                                 
140 E.g. Article 25 on the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family. 
141 E.g. Article 11 on the right to an adequate standard of living as well as freedom from hunger.  
142 The Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region (as amended at 
Manila, 28 August 1997). Online: 
http://www.lawasia.asn.au/uploads/images/BeijingStatement.pdf. 
143 PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van [2004] 2 SLR 328 at 359; see also CL Lim, ‘Public International Law 
Before the Singapore and Malaysian Courts’, (2004) 8 SYBIL 243 at 248. 
144 This is not entirely clear but the Malaysian position is presumably the same as Singapore 
following the decision of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Police Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 
at 449 (on UNDHR). 
145 One exception is Sagong bin Tasi v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2002] 2 MLJ at 591, wherein 
the Malaysian High Court was persuaded by the statement in the Australian decision of Mabo v. 
Queensland (1991-1992) 175 CLR 1 that “international law” is a “legitimate and important 
influence on the development of the common law”. The High Court then referred to the 
“worldwide recognition” of aboriginal rights and ruled that the orang asli in Sagong bin Tasi had a 
proprietary interest in their customary and ancestral lands; see also PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van 
[2004] 2 SLR 328 and Nguyen Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103 (which appears to endorse the 
position that Singapore is bound by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as 
a rule of customary international law). For the latter case, see CL Lim, “The Constitution and the 
Reception of Customary International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van V. Public Prosecutor” [2005] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 218; Thio Li-Ann, “The Death Penalty as Cruel and Inhuman 
Punishment Before the Singapore High Court? Customary Human Rights Norms, Constitutional 
Formalism and the Supremacy of Domestic Law in Public Prosecutor v. Nguyen Tuong Van” 
(2004) 4(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 1. 
25
Chan: Access to Justice in Singapore and Malaysia
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
 law cases such as Hau Tua Tau v. PP146 and PP v. Chin Siew Noi147 (citing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).148 The story is the same for human 
rights at the regional level. In the protection of the right of access to the court 
pursuant to the European Convention of Human Rights, 149  the progress and 
influence of the European Court of Human Rights has not greatly penetrated the 
Singapore and Malaysian shores. This may be attributed, in part, to the different 
“Asian” view of human rights espoused in Malaysia and Singapore.150 Although 
there have been judicial discourse in the Malaysian and Singapore courts on the 
European Convention of Human Rights, the European position has not been 
accepted.151 Aside from the non-acceptance of European influences, it is noted 
that the citation of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in the case 
of Jabar v. PP152 did not persuade the Singapore court either. 
 
B. Judicial Discourse On The Right of Legal Representation, Right to 
Counsel, Legal Aid and Contingency Fees 
 
The availability of legal representation is crucial to the goal of enhancing access 
to justice for potential litigants and accused persons. In the English case of Leech, 
the court held that a prisoner's unimpeded right of access to a solicitor for the 
purpose of receiving advice and assistance in connection with the possible 
initiation of civil proceedings in the courts was regarded as “an inseparable part of 
the right of access to  the courts”.153   
 
                                                 
146 [1981] 2 MLJ at 49. 
147 CC 6/90. 
148 Simon Tay, “The Singapore Legal System and International Law” in Kevin Tan (ed.), The 
Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press, 1999) at p. 482. 
149 See e.g. Golder v. United Kingdom [1975] ECHR 1. 
150 See Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, UN 
World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok, 1993 [Bangkok Declaration]. This “Asian” view 
is, however, not an absolute one and does not preclude the Singapore and Malaysian courts from 
endorsing foreign court decisions from the West even on matters relating to fundamental human 
rights: see e.g. PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van [2004] 2 SLR 328 at 360 (citing a US decision that 
hanging did not violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishments) and 
Nguyen Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103.  
151 See e.g. Kok Wah Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan [2004] 5 MLJ 193 
at paras. 96-100 which rejected the applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights cited in the Privy Council case of Director of PP of Jamaica v. Mollison [2003] 2 
W.L.R. 1160; see also JB Jeyaratnam v. Lee Kuan Yew [1993] 1 SLR 185. 
152 [1995] 1 SLR 617. 
153 [1994] QB 198 at 210. See also R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Anderson [1984] 1 QB 778. 
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 From the practical perspective, the lawyer is better placed, in the context 
of an adversarial system, to provide greater access to justice as he or she is trained 
in the litigation process, unlike the lay litigant.154 A study155 conducted on the 
subordinate courts of Singapore, albeit fairly dated, has disclosed, subject to some 
caveats,156 that (i) accused persons with legal representation in criminal trials have 
a significantly greater chance of acquittal than those who are unrepresented; and 
(ii) accused persons who are legally represented have a greater likelihood of 
receiving less severe sentences157 than those who are represented. 
 For purposes of clarity, it should not be inferred from the discussion in this 
sub-section B that if a litigant is not legally represented, whether in a civil or 
criminal case, he or she is denied access to justice. Legal institutions such as the 
judiciary should continue to play the role of ensuring and maintaining access to 
justice for the litigant in person.158 The focus here is on litigants who desire to be 
legally represented, but whose right to exercise that choice has been denied or 
severely restricted, whether due to financial circumstances or other reasons. 
 
1.  The Right to Legal Representation 
 
Whilst a right to legal representation exists in Singapore, the right is, similar to 
the English position, not absolute. Moreover, it would appear that the right to 
legal representation in civil cases cannot be elevated to a constitutional right in 
both Singapore and Malaysia for the reasons stated below. 
In the Singapore case of Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club159, Hwang 
J.C. stated, in the context of an inquiry before a domestic tribunal, that the right to 
legal representation was based on natural justice. The domestic tribunal possesses 
a discretion to allow (or disallow) such legal representation according to what 
natural justice demands in the particular circumstances of the case. The following 
quote is instructive: 
 
                                                 
154 See Denning MR in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd (No. 1) [1969] 1 Q.B. 125 at 
132. 
155 Stanley Yeo Meng Heong, “Unrepresented Defendants in the Subordinate Criminal Courts of 
Singapore (1979-1980)” (1981) 23 Malaya Law Review 41. 
156 Factors and possibilities which have not been taken into consideration in the study include (1) 
some of the accused did not engage lawyers because they regarded the evidence against them to be 
very strong; (2) unrepresented defendants might be more likely to have previous conviction 
records than represented defendants; and (3) defendants who can afford legal counsel come from 
better socio-economic and educational backgrounds than those who are unrepresented: see Stanley 
Yeo, Ibid, at 44. 
157 The study treats non-custodial sentences as less severe than custodial sentences: Stanley Yeo, 
supra note 155 at 48. 
158 See Toh Han Li, “Facing the court, lawyerless”, The Straits Times (24 May 2006). 
159 [1993] 2 SLR 388. 
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 The right to be heard can be a meaningless right if exercised by a person who is 
unable in the circumstances to present his case effectively by himself. If the 
natural justice principle is applied, the right to legal representation only arises if, 
in the circumstances of the case, the subject of the inquiry cannot be effectively 
heard without the assistance of counsel, and where the consequences of the 
inquiry are such that the right to be heard would also import the right to appoint 
counsel. 
 
The learned Judicial Commissioner outlined some factors to be considered by the 
domestic tribunal such as the seriousness of the allegations and potential penalties, 
whether points of law are likely to arise, the capacity of the individual to present 
his or her case. 160  Such rights may be excluded by appropriate provisions, 
expressly or by necessary implication, subject to challenges on the grounds of 
ultra vires or unreasonableness.161 
The learned Judicial Commissioner also considered the import of section 
29 of Singapore’s Legal Profession Act162 which provides that “[a]dvocates and 
solicitors shall, subject to the provisions of any written law, have the exclusive 
right to appear and plead in all courts of justice in Singapore according to the law 
in force in those courts”. Does this confer a statutory right to legal representation 
to a litigant in the courts of justice?163 Hwang J.C. in Kok Seng Chong did not 
arrive at a firm conclusion on this issue. Based on the literal language, the 
provision does not purport to confer any right on the potential litigant, but rather 
on the lawyer himself.  
Moving on to an examination of the Malaysian legal position, Raja Azlan 
Shah J. (as he then was) in Doresamy v. Public Services Commission,164 a case 
involving disciplinary proceedings before the Public Services Disciplinary Board, 
appeared to suggest a general right of legal representation, in particular where a 
person’s reputation and livelihood are at stake. In addition, the learned judge was 
of the view that the right is necessitated by “the ideal of equality before the law” 
and the need for the aggrieved person to be given the fullest opportunity to defend 
himself.165 With reference to the “equality of the law”, it is not entirely clear 
whether the learned judge was arguing that the right to legal representation ought 
to be conferred constitutional status under Article 8 of the Federal Constitution.166 
                                                 
160 See Webster J in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Tarrant [1984] 1 
All ER 799; R v. Board of Visitors of HM Prison, The Maze, ex parte Hone [1988] AC 379. 
161 [1992] SLR 388 at 406. In this regard, the Singapore Small Claims Tribunals Act (s 23), for 
example, does not permit legal representation so as to ensure the litigants’ costs are affordable. 
162 Section 35 of the Malaysian Legal Profession Act.  
163 For a discussion on the meaning of “court of justice” in section 29, see Tan Yock Lin, The Law 
of Advocates and Solicitors in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths, 1998) at pp. 119-122. 
164 [1971] 2 MLJ 127. 
165 ]1971] 2 MLJ 127 at 130. 
166 See also Article 12 of the Singapore Constitution. 
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 Based on the mere statement above without further judicial elaboration and 
substantiation, it would not be advisable to make any firm conclusions on the 
constitutional status.  
Subsequently, in Federal Hotel Sdn Bhd v. National Union of Hotel, Bar 
and Restaurant Workers,167 the Federal Court recognised the underlying premises 
of natural justice in allowing an equal right to legal representation. As the 
appellant in that case was refused legal representation during the proceedings by 
the Industrial Arbitration Court, the Federal Court held that there was a “gross 
violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice”. The Federal Court was 
of the view that the proposition was “well-established” without reference, 
unfortunately, to supporting cases.  
In the recent case of Marathaei d/o Sangalullai (suing on behalf of the 
estate of Thangayah Aupulley) v. Syarikat Containers (M) Sdn Bhd,168  in the 
context of proceedings before the Industrial Arbitration Court, Gopal Sri Ram 
J.C.A. stated that the right of legal representation is a “common law right” which 
was not removed by the Industrial Relations Act 1967.169 As the Act in question 
was silent on the issue, the Court of Appeal read such a right of legal 
representation, based on the principles of procedural fairness, into the statute.  
As Byles J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works170 put it, “the justice 
of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature”. In keeping with 
the learned judge’s approach in Sugumar and Kekatong discussed above in sub-
section A, Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A. reminded us that Parliament cannot enact a law 
ultra vires Article 8 of the Federal Constitution. The learned judge also said that a 
strong presumption applies in that case to the effect that Parliament does not 
intend an unfair or unjust result (i.e. that the statute would accord with the rule of 
law in Article 8 of the Federal Constitution).  
In summary, the limited Singapore judicial discourse on the right of legal 
representation does not indicate that it is to be treated as a constitutional right. On 
the other hand, the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Marathaei appears to treat the 
right to legal representation as a common law right which accords with fairness 
and the rule of law, reminiscent of his Honour’s approach in Sugumar and 
Kekatong. However, in view of the Federal Court’s strong position against Gopal 
Sri Ram’s approach in the Sugumar and Kekatong cases, it appears that such a 
legal position would probably not be endorsed by the Federal Court. 
 
 
                                                 
167 [1983] 1 MLJ 175. 
168 [2003] 2 MLJ 337. 
169 On the facts of the case, the appellant was not denied legal representation, but representation by 
an officer of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress. 
170 (1863) 143 ER 414 at 420 (cited by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Marathaei). 
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 2. The Right to Counsel of the Arrested Person 
 
We should also briefly discuss the right to counsel in, amongst others, criminal 
law and preventive detention contexts. This right is expressly granted in Article 
5(3) of the Federal Constitution which is in pari materia with Article 9(3) of the 
Singapore Constitution.171 The provision states that “[w]here a person is arrested, 
he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be 
allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.” It is 
clear that the right to counsel for the arrested person is a constitutional right, 
though the scope is arguably more restricted in Singapore and Malaysia than 
might be envisaged from the literal language.  
In Malaysia, the constitutional right of an arrested person to consult his or 
her lawyer commences from the time of arrest, although that right may be 
exercised subject to the need to balance the right to counsel with the duty of the 
police to protect the public from wrongdoers by apprehending them and collecting 
required evidence.172  
In Singapore, the right may be exercised after a “reasonable time” from 
the arrest173, and the determination of “reasonable time” depends on the same 
underlying policies. It has been held that two weeks was a reasonable period on 
the facts in Jasbir Singh v. Public Prosecutor,174 notwithstanding that Article 9(4) 
of the Singapore Constitution and Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution specify 
periods of 48 and 24 hours respectively for the arrested person to be brought 
before the Magistrate. 175  Further, it appears that the exercise of the right to 
counsel may be permitted in Singapore only after the making of the statement 
pursuant to section 122(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 176 
                                                 
171 See generally, Kevin Tan and Thio Li-Ann, supra note 122 at pp. 557-580.  
172 See Hashim bin Saud v. Yahaya bin Hashim [1977] 2 MLJ 116 at 118; Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer 
in Charge Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198. 
173 Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore [1971] 2 MLJ 137.  
174 [1994] 2 SLR 18.  
175 In section 36 of the Singapore Criminal Procedure Code, the period stated is 48 hours for 
persons arrested without warrant and detained in police custody. The corresponding period in 
section 24 of the Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) is 24 hours; however, section 117 
of the Malaysian CPC provides that the Magistrates may authorize the detention of the accused in 
such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term “not exceeding fifteen days in the whole” 
where it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours 
as stipulated in section 28 and there are “grounds for believing that the accusation or information 
is well founded”. 
176 Cap. 68, 1985 Rev. Ed. Yong CJ in Jasbir Singh stated that section 122(6) statement, which 
provides for a written notification to be served on persons charged with an offence, does not 
compel the accused to make self-incriminating statements. For a critique, see KS Rajah SC, ‘The 
Constitutional Right of Access to Counsel’, Law Gazette, August 2002 (4). 
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 This issue on the time of exercise of the right to counsel has generated 
much debate and disquiet. The Law Society of Singapore has proposed that there 
should be access to counsel during the investigation stage of police custody, 
which hitherto has been denied.177 The recent incident involving a Navy sergeant 
charged with a drug offence who was allegedly denied access to counsel for a 
month due to pending investigations certainly did not help to allay the concerns. 
178 In Malaysia, the National Human Rights Commission (Suhakam) has also 
proposed that the right to counsel should be unfettered and exercised immediately 
upon arrest.179  
It is argued that the right to counsel should be exercised within 48 hours 
after the arrest of the person, even if investigations on the alleged act or offence of 
the accused or detainee have not been completed. There is no language in either 
constitution which suggests that investigations must be completed before the right 
to access may be exercised. 180  There is also no concrete evidence that the 
presence of lawyers will unduly impede investigations. 181  Due to the grave 
consequences ensuing from the potential deprivation of life and liberty of the 
accused,182 any doubt as to the determination of the time period for exercise of the 
right to counsel should also be presumed in favour of the accused person or 
detainee. 
Apart from the issue of the appropriate time for exercise of the right, the 
scope of the right itself has also been limited. Such right extends only to the 
choice of counsel who is willing and able to act for the accused person. It does not 
necessarily follow from the grant of the constitutional right that the trial of an 
accused person is vitiated unless he is represented by counsel.183 The accused 
                                                 
177 Philip Jeyaretnam SC, President of the Law Society of Singapore’s speech at the Opening of 
the Legal Year 2006. Online: http://www.lawsociety.org.sg (7 January 2006) at para. 6. 
178  See KC Vijayan, “Navy sergeant in drug case had no access to lawyer for a month                          
Counsel not allowed during probe; law group wonders if constitutional rights were denied”,                               
The Straits Times (15 March, 2006) and the response from the Ministry of Defence, “Sergeant Not 
Repeatedly Denied Access to Lawyer”, The Straits Times (20 March 2006); see also “Editorial”, 
Pro Bono (newsletter of the Association of Criminal Lawyers, Vol. 2 No. 1, February 2006).                                   
179 Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia Report, “Forum on the Right to an Expeditious and 
Fair Trial” (7-8 April 2005) at p. 11. 
180 See Abdul Ghani Harron v. Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 2 MLJ 689. 
181 See Amer Hamzah Arshad, “Rights of Accused Persons: Are Safeguards Being Reduced?”. 
Online: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/1577/27/ (2004). 
182 See PP v. Choo Chuan Wang [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep.) 329 in which the court held that the right to 
a fair hearing within a reasonable time in criminal cases is part of the right to life and liberty in 
Article 5 of the Federal Constitution. 
183 Mohamed Ali Abdullah v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 201. 
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 person does not have the right to be informed of his right to counsel.184 As such, 
there is no right for the accused to contact third parties to enquire about his right 
to counsel.185   
In the light of the various restrictions on the right to counsel, the recent 
Malaysian case of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara186 
involving the detention of “reformasi” activists in 2001 must appear to be a bright 
light in a darkened tunnel.  Siti Norma Yaacob F.C.J. in that case correctly 
determined that the ISA was subject to and cannot deny the right to counsel found 
in Article 5(3), notwithstanding the existence of Article 149 of the Federal 
Constitution.187 According to the learned judge, Article 149 relates only to the 
validity of the ISA, not the constitutionality of the right to counsel.  
In addition, to ensure that the fundamental right to consult the counsel of 
their choice under Article 5(3) is not “illusory or ineffective”, the learned judge 
emphasised that the police must act “promptly and professionally” and give 
priority to their investigations on the acts and conduct of the detainees. 
 
3.  Legal Aid 
 
The availability of legal aid is clearly an important ingredient for ensuring access 
to justice for indigent litigants. 188  Only a small proportion of the Singapore 
population would be able to satisfy both the disposable capital and means test 
under the Singapore Legal Aid and Advice Act.189 There have been recent calls by 
Members of Parliament to the government to increase legal aid which was last 
                                                 
184 PP v. Mazlan bin Maidun [1993] 1 SLR 512; contra the Privy Council decision of Attorney-
General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Whiteman [1991] 2 WLR 1200; see also Michael Hor, “The 
Right to Counsel – The Right To Be Informed”, (1993) 5 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 141.  
185 Sun Hongyu v. PP [2005] 2 SLR 750 at 760. 
186 [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
187 Article 149 reads: “If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or threatened by a 
substantial body of persons, whether inside of outside the Federation – 
[(a) to (e) … 
(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, the Federation or any part thereof, 
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is valid notwithstanding that it is 
inconsistent with any of the provisions of Article 5, 9, 10 or 13, or would apart from this Article 
be outside the legislative power of Parliament …”] 
188 The Minister for Labour Mr Lim Yew Hock, in moving the Legal Aid and Advice Bill in 1956, 
said: 
Where inadequate facilities exist for a citizen of limited means to seek redress through 
the Courts for a wrong which has been done to him, or to obtain legal aid for his defence 
when he is committed for trial, then justice becomes a rationed commodity not freely 
available to all. (see Parliamentary Debates Reports, Sitting Date 6 June 1956, Col. 1957). 
189 See Adrian Yeo, “Access to Justice: A Case for Contingency Fees in Singapore” (2004) 16 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 76 at 141. 
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 revised in 2001.190 Notwithstanding the increase in the means threshold for state 
legal aid, it is clear there are litigants who remain unrepresented.191 This is not to 
downplay the efforts of the State, the assigned and volunteer lawyers who have 
collectively played important roles in providing legal aid in civil and criminal 
cases for the poor in both Singapore192 and Malaysia.193  
In both Singapore and Malaysia, there is little judicial discourse on the 
right to legal aid.194 Judges have commented extra-judicially on the inadequacy of 
state legal aid195 but have not made important judicial pronouncements on the 
nature and scope of the right to legal aid. Hence, what follows are basically more 
questions rather than answers about the proper judicial perspective on the right to 
legal aid (or more precisely, the lack thereof) in Singapore and Malaysia.  
As a starting point, we note that the right to legal aid is circumscribed by 
statute and regulations with respect to the scope of applicable proceedings.196 In 
Singapore and Malaysia, there does not appear to be evidence of an express or 
implied constitutional right to obtain legal aid in both criminal and civil cases. It 
is understandable that the right to legal aid, even if it exists, may not be absolute, 
but is likely to be subject to government funds and resources for the provision of 
legal aid.197  
However, a pertinent question which may be raised is, should there not be 
some fundamental threshold case in which the state must be obliged to provide 
                                                 
190 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Sitting Date 13 March 2003, Vol. 76, Cols. 698-701; and 
Parliamentary Debates, Sitting Date 18 October 2005, Col. 1653. 
191 See Philip Jeyaretnam SC, supra note 177, at para. 5 (in which the President of the Law 
Society intimated that a “public-private partnership” would better meet the needs of the less well-
off). The Council had urged the setting up of a pro bono scheme for young lawyers to address 
unmet legal needs in society (see Philip Jeyaretnam, “The Future of the Law Society”. Online: 
http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2006-4/Default.htm (April 2006).) 
192 The Legal Aid Bureau in Singapore provides only civil legal aid. The Criminal Legal Aid 
Scheme (CLAS), under the auspices of the Singapore Society, provides for the poor and needy in 
non-capital charges. CLAS applications are based on the type of offence as well as a means test: 
see “Criminal Legal Aid Scheme”. Online: http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/html/CLAS/CLAS.html. 
193 The Malaysian state-funded Legal Aid Bureau is set up pursuant to the Malaysia Legal Aid Act 
1971 and Legal Aid and Advice Regulations 1970. For a brief discussion of the history and the 
initial years after its establishment, see Abu Bakar Bin Awang, “Access to Justice: Legal 
Assistance to the Poor in Malaysia” [1979] 1 MLJ xlix.  
194 Compare with India in which public interest litigation has established the right to legal aid: see 
e.g. Sheela Barse v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 378. 
195 For example, a Singapore Judge has suggested increasing the disposal income figure under the 
means test: see “In Conversation: An Interview with the Honourable Judicial Commissioner Lai 
Siu Chiu” (1992) 13 Singapore Law Review 1 at 21. 
196 See e.g. section 5(2) and (3) of the Singapore Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap. 160) (1996 Rev. 
Ed.); regulation 5 of the Legal Aid and Advice Regulations; and Malaysia Legal Aid and Advice 
Act 1971, Third Schedule. 
197 See Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 323 (Brennan J.); 330 (Deane J). 
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 legal aid in a criminal case?198  For instance, in a capital case, should there not be 
a constitutional right for the accused to obtain legal aid? This may now seem like 
a moot point since lawyers are assigned to the accused persons in capital cases as 
a matter of procedure.199 But what happens if the procedure is ceased? Is there 
any constitutional challenge to prevent such a procedure from ceasing, failing 
which the accused cannot be tried in a court of law? Taking a less extreme case, 
we can also ask whether we should grant a right to legal aid in a case where the 
accused person’s reputation or livelihood will be threatened200 or the accused is 
prosecuted for a serious offence.201  
In Malaysia, the court rules provide for a more generic criterion of “the 
interests of justice” for the judicial determination of whether legal aid should be 
given, 202  albeit without any constitutional status. In Singapore, this criterion 
appears to be limited to legal aid in respect of criminal appeals to the Singapore 
Court of Appeal.203  
From the more macro perspective, we can inquire about the extent of state 
resources and the manner of allocation. What if an irresponsible government 
decides to drastically cut down on state legal aid provisions? Is there any recourse 
for the ordinary citizen at the courthouse? What are the state’s obligations with 
respect to the provision of legal aid?  
In the European Court decision of Airey v. Ireland,204 the state was held to 
be under an obligation to provide civil legal aid pursuant to Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In that case, 
Mrs Airey was not able to effectively present her petition for judicial separation 
without legal representation. Significantly, the European Court had also indicated 
                                                 
198 In the United States, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel where his or her 
personal liberty is at stake: see Gideon v. Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963); compare the Australian 
position in Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 which does not recognise a right of access 
to counsel for an accused at public expense but the court has the power to stay the criminal 
proceedings if access to counsel is essential to a fair trial.  
199 See rule 96(a) of the Malaysian Rules of the Federal Court 1995 and 66(a) of the Malaysian 
Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994; rule 11(a) of the Singapore Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) 
Rules, 1997 Rev. Ed. 
200  Barnabas A. Samatta, “Access to the Courts for the Poor”, (2003) 15(2) Commonwealth 
Judicial Journal (Journal of the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association) 29 at 30; 
see also Doresamy v. Public Services Commission [1971] 2 MLJ 127 (in the context of the right to 
legal representation). 
201 See Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (accused persons charged with a serious 
offence should in most cases be represented). 
202 Rule 96(b) of the Malaysian Rules of the Federal Court 1995 and rule 66(b) of the Malaysian 
Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994. 
203 Rule 11(b) of the Singapore Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules, 1997 Rev. Ed. 
204 (1980) 2 EHRR 305. See also Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom Application no. 64816/01, 15 
February 2005. See generally, Shirley Shipman, “Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom: legal aid in 
the European Court of Human Rights” (2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 5. 
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 that states should have a free choice as to the means to ensure the effective right 
of access to the courts. Article II-107 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union states that legal aid shall be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to 
justice.205 The US Supreme Court has held in Lassiter v Department of Social 
Services206 by a narrow margin that there is no broad-based constitutional right of 
access for indigent litigants but only a restricted right for legal aid in civil cases 
where the fundamental fairness of the particular proceeding would proved to be 
adversely affected. It remains to be seen whether the Singapore and Malaysian 
courts would be persuaded by the European and US developments on this issue or 
adopt other approaches. 
Challenges to administrative decision-making on legal aid eligibility 
matters have not been excluded by Parliament. A few examples of potential areas 
for judicial review shall suffice here. The present author is not aware of any case 
where judicial review was sought in respect of an administrative decision to 
refuse legal aid under the pertinent legislation in Singapore and Malaysia. Hence, 
it would be difficult to make any firm conclusions on the judicial approach. 
According to the Singapore Legal Aid and Advice Act, the Director has the 
discretion to refuse legal aid “if it appears to him unreasonable that the applicant 
should receive it in the particular circumstances of the case”.207 Hilborne has 
criticised the provision as bearing “the divine seal of bureaucratic authority, for 
they postulate that but for the Director’s benediction, there is no such thing in 
Singapore as legal aid”.208 Though judicial review remains a possibility, it is 
practically difficult and costly for the poor litigant to engage counsel to initiate a 
judicial review. 209   The Malaysian statute provides for authorisation to the 
Director to give legal aid if the Minister is “satisfied” that a particular case of 
hardship is supported by public interests.210  
 There is some evidence of a judicial role, though, in assigning or 
appointing a lawyer to assist indigent litigants in Singapore and Malaysia. For 
                                                 
205 See Ross Cranston, supra note 1 at p. 37. 
206 452 US 18 (1981). For a critique of the limited protection afforded to civil litigants in Lassiter, 
see Bruce Boyer, “Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent 
Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham” (2005) 
36 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 363. 
207 Section 8(3) Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1996 Rev. Ed. Tan has interpreted the provision to 
mean that the Director may assess the behaviour of the applicant in relation to the proceedings: 
Tan Yock Lin, supra note 163, para 174. See also s. 17(3) of the Malaysian Legal Aid and Advice 
Act 1971. 
208 K. E. Hilborne, “The Quality of Legal Aid in Singapore” [1969] 2 MLJ xlii at xliv. 
209 See Yeo Hwee Ying, “Provision of Legal Aid in Singapore” in Kevin Tan (ed.), The Singapore 
Legal System (Singapore University Press, 1999) at p. 464 (at footnote 29). 
210 Section 12(3) of the Malaysian Legal Aid and Advice Act. 
35
Chan: Access to Justice in Singapore and Malaysia
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
 instance, section 74 of the Singapore Supreme Court Judicature Act provides that 
the High Court is obliged to assign an advocate and solicitor to a person against 
whom an order preventing legal proceedings or discontinuation thereof by a 
vexatious litigant211 has been made and who is “unable on account of poverty” to 
engage a lawyer.212 In Malaysia, a poor person “may” petition for admission as a 
“pauper”. 213  The Malaysian Court of Appeal “may” admit the petitioner to 
proceed as a pauper and “shall” thereupon appoint a solicitor to represent the 
pauper.214  
 
4. Contingency Fees 
 
Traditional English common law has prohibited contingency fee agreements215 on 
the grounds of maintenance and champerty. These common law prohibitions have 
been imported into Malaysia216 and Singapore.217 However, the historical and 
underlying policy for the prohibition against maintenance and champerty as one 
aimed at the problem of corruption of royal officials in England, not lawyers,218 
has not been fully appreciated in the countries of export.  
Thus, the rule against contingency fees continues to be maintained in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Apart from the common law prohibitions against 
contingency fee agreements, Singapore also maintains a statutory219 prohibition 
against contingency fee agreements in contentious proceedings. Malaysia has 
similar statutory220 prohibitions in place as well. To reinforce the prohibitory 
nature of the rule, there are also disciplinary sanctions for lawyers who enter into 
champertous agreements.221  
                                                 
211 See the UK Vexatious Actions Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 51) and Re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21; 
Section 42 of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981. 
212 Section 74(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322, 1999 Rev. Ed.). 
213 Rules 31 and 32 of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal. 
214 See rule 32(5) of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994. 
215 This agreement consists of the payment of a lawyer’s fees contingent upon the outcome of the 
litigation. 
216 Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956. 
217 Section 3 of the Application of English Law Act. 
218 Philip Thomas, “Contingency Fees: A Case Study for Malaysia” (1981) Anglo-American Law 
Review 37 at 45. 
219 Section 107 (1)(b) of the Singapore Legal Profession Act; r. 37(b) of the Legal Profession 
(Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap. 161, R. 1, 2000 Rev. Ed.) (“An advocate and solicitor shall 
not enter into any negotiation with a client – (a) for an interest in the subject matter of litigation; or 
(b) except to the extent permitted by any scale of costs which may be applicable, for remuneration 
proportionate to the amount which may be recovered by the client in the proceedings”). 
220 Section 112 of the Legal Profession Act, 1976. 
221 Re Chan Chow Wang (1982-3) SLR 413. 
36
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2
 It is clear that a strict prohibition against contingency fees hinders access 
to justice for indigent persons.222 Those who may be ineligible for legal aid may 
find it financially onerous to afford the legal fees of lawyers. Legal fees in 
Singapore and Malaysia comprise a substantial component of a litigant’s total 
legal costs. In addition, in both Malaysia and Singapore, a losing party would 
usually have to bear the risks of having to pay the legal costs of the victorious 
party. Hence, if the potential litigants are prevented from entering into 
contingency fee agreements with lawyers, access to justice may be unduly 
impeded. We have already discussed in sub-section B (i) above the contribution 
and value of legal representation to a litigant in an adversarial system such as in 
Singapore and Malaysia. 
Similar to the case for legal aid as discussed above, there is little judicial 
discourse in Malaysia and Singapore on contingency fees and access to justice, 
though it is noted that the English common law prohibitions against maintenance 
and champerty may be relaxed in Singapore 223  due to the necessity and 
practicability of maintaining litigation by trade unions and insurance 
companies. 224   The United Kingdom has enacted legislation permitting 
contingency fees in specified circumstances to provide greater access to justice 
for litigants. 225  Insofar as Singapore and Malaysia continue to prohibit 
contingency fees, it is argued that common law developments (including the 
developments in Australia226 and the UK prior to the legislative reforms) and their 
underlying rationale, particularly in connection with access to justice, may be 
relevant and, perhaps, even persuasive in the two jurisdictions.  
 
                                                 
222 See Stephan Landsman, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History” (1998) 
47 DePaul Law Review 261; Russell CJ in Ladd v. London Road Car Co (1990) 110 Law Times 
80. 
223 See Lim Lie Hoa v. Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 2 SLR 320.  
224 Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] 1 QB 373. 
225 Access to Justice Act 1999. 
226 With respect to Australia, see the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Campbells 
Cash and Carry Pty Limited v Fostif Pty Limited; Australian Liquor Marketers Pty Limited v 
Berney [2006] HCA 41 in the context of litigation funding. In Campbells, Gummow, Hayne and 
Crennan JJ cited at para. 65 Mason P’s statement that the “law now looks favourably on funding 
arrangements that offer access to justice so long as any tendency to abuse of process is controlled” 
and that “public policy now recognises that it is desirable, in order to facilitate access to justice, 
that third parties should provide assistance designed to ensure that those who are involved in 
litigation have the benefit of legal representation”; Kirby J at paras. 144 and 145 reinforced the 
notion of access to justice as a “fundamental human right” (cf Callinan and Heydon JJ at para. 
265). See also Lee Aitken, “Litigation Lending” After Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, 
or a Licence to “Bottomfeeders”?” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 171; Smart AJ in Volpes v 
Permanent Custodians Limited [2005] NSWSC 827; Gore v Justice Corp Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 354. 
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 The English Court of Appeal in Thai Trading Co (a firm) v. Taylor227 is 
one such case. The court in Thai Trading relaxed the rule against contingency fees 
in respect of an agreement where the lawyer is to be paid ordinary costs if he wins 
the case and not if he loses. Millet J. in Thai Trading remarked that access to 
justice is a “fundamental human right” which ought to be readily available to 
all. 228  The learned judge also observed that the current attitudes towards 
contingency fees, as demonstrated by the legislative reforms in the United 
Kingdom permitting such arrangements, rest on the significant public policy of 
“making justice accessible to persons of modest means”. 229  
Shortly after, the Court of Appeal in Awwad v. Geraghty & Co (a firm)230 
disapproved of the decision in Thai Trading and held that such contingency fee 
agreements are unenforceable as against public policy.231 However, this may not 
preclude the court from examining the facts of the particular case to determine if 
the contingency fee agreement in question undermines “the ends of justice”.232 
Further, despite the disapproval of Thai Trading, Schiemann L.J. in Awwad 
recognised the public policy arguments for conditional fees, one of which is that it 
facilitates access to justice for the public.233 Singapore and Malaysian courts have 
not referred to these cases. 
Whilst the Singapore and Malaysian courts may develop the common law 
principles on maintenance and champerty incrementally, they do not have the 
power to reshape the law against contingency fees due to the existing statutory 
prohibitions. This exercise would require legislative reforms,234 rather than the 
incremental common law process.  
However, there is technically nothing to prevent the Singapore and 
Malaysian courts from advocating in their judgments legislative changes to permit 
contingency fees consistent with their convictions. To the writer’s knowledge, the 
courts have not actively argued in their judgments for legislative changes to 
accommodate contingency fees in Singapore and Malaysia, unlike in other 
                                                 
227 [1998] 3 All ER 65. 
228 [1998] 3 All ER 65 at para. 18. 
229 [1998] 3 All ER 65 at para. 32. 
230 [2000] 1 All ER 608. 
231 The Court stated that contingency fee agreements are in breach of the prohibition in r. 8(1) of 
the UK Solicitors’ Practices Rules 1990. 
232 See R (Factortame Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 8) [2003] QB 381 at 400. 
233 [2000] 1 All ER 608 at 623. 
234 For arguments on proposed legislative reforms in Singapore, see Gary Chan, “Re-examining 
Public Policy – a Case for Conditional Fees in Singapore” (2004) 33(2) Common Law World 
Review 130; and Adrian Yeo, “Access to Justice: A Case for Contingency Fees in Singapore” 
(2004) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 76. 
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 Commonwealth jurisdictions,235 though some of the judges have commented via 
extra-judicial statements on contingency fees and access to justice. For instance, 
the Honourable Dato’ Low Hop Bing, the High Court judge in Malaysia, had in 
1982 commented in a journal article that contingency fees would provide an easy 
and expedient access to justice, though he also recognised other public policy 
concerns against the introduction of contingency fees.236 In the final analysis, 
though, judicial discourse in Singapore and Malaysia on the relationship between 




The search for constitutionalism and rights in the context of access to justice in 
Singapore and Malaysia has not been an entirely fruitful one. Judicial discourse in 
both Malaysia and Singapore, gleaned from case law and extra-bench 
pronouncements, suggests that the access to justice, broadly construed, has not 
been accorded constitutional status. The position adopted by the Malaysian 
Federal Court in the Sugumar and Kekatong episodes has greatly diluted the 
constitutional significance attached by Gopal Sri Ram J.C.A to the right of access 
to justice in the abovementioned cases. Based on trends in constitutional 
adjudication in the recent past, tentative indications are that the Singapore courts 
are not likely to adopt a pro-active rights-based and constitutional approach to the 
issue of access to justice. However, the Singapore judiciary, led by the recently 
appointed Chief Justice, may choose to depart from its past approaches to 
constitutional interpretation and take a more robust position on access to justice 
reminiscent of Chng Suan Tze.  
Associated with the general right of access to justice, we note that the right 
to legal representation does not enjoy a constitutional status in Singapore and 
Malaysia. Whilst the right to counsel in criminal and preventive detention cases is 
entrenched in the constitution in both jurisdictions, this right to counsel has been 
fairly restricted. Public debate on this issue looks likely to continue and test the 
boundaries of the right. With respect to legal aid, there is as yet no indication of a 
substantive and enforceable right to legal aid, save for those specifically granted 
in legal aid legislation, which can be removed by Parliament. Contingency fee 
                                                 
235 See the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in McIntyre Estate v. Ontario [2002] OJ No. 
3417, 10 September, 2002 (at para. 85) which had urged the Ontario government to enact 
legislation to permit contingency fees. 
236 Public policy concerns include the unprofessional conduct of lawyers and higher legal fees: see 
Low Hop Bing, “Contingent Fee – Expedient Access to Justice” [1982] 2 MLJ iv; at the time of 
publication of his article, the learned judge was serving as President, Sessions Court in Ipoh, 
Malaysia. Cf Yong CJ’s views in “In Conversation: An Interview With the Honourable Chief 
Justice Mr Yong Pung How” [1991] Singapore Law Review 1 at 23-24 (adopting a cautious 
approach to the introduction of contingency fees). 
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 agreements, notwithstanding its important role in enhancing access to justice for 
persons ineligible for legal aid but who could ill-afford the legal fees, continues to 
be prohibited in Singapore and Malaysia. 
 To conclude, more judicial discourse and clarification in Singapore on the 
right of access to justice would be welcomed. As for Malaysia, although there has 
been active judicial debate and discourse on the right of access to justice, it is 
hoped that a more liberal approach may be adopted in the future. It should, 
however, be pointed out that the responsibility for ensuring a comprehensive and 
healthy set of rights pertaining to access to justice does not merely lie on judicial 
shoulders, however broad they may be. Other institutions such as the Parliament 
and Executive need to partake actively in this joint venture to maintain and 
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